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RECENT BOOKS 
CONGRESS - ITS CONTEMPORARY RoLE. Second Revised Edition. By 
Ernest F. Griffith. New York: New York University Press. 1956. Pp. 200. 
$3.50. 
Dr. Griffith draws upon his long experience with Congress from the 
vantage point of Director of the Legislative Reference Service to portray 
the functioning of the Congress in modem complex society. The second 
revised edition adds one chapter, "Congress and Administration," to the 
fifteen chapters of his earlier work which are brought up to date. The new 
chapter, in tum, draws heavily upon chapter nine of the author's American 
System of Government (1954). 
Dr. Griffith sees the Congress confronted with two dangers-pressure 
groups and an expanded "technically competent" bureaucracy which threat-
ens to become a "dictatorship of the civil service"-and describes the devices 
Congress has developed to combat these dangers. He finds those devices 
generally satisfactory and has only minor reforms to recommend. 
With respect to pressure groups, he notes with favor the protection of 
individual Representatives from reward or political punishment by special 
interests through the power of the House Rules Committee to prevent 
embarrassing measures from reaching the floor for a vote, through a pene-
trating analysis of pressure-backed proposals in committee hearings, through 
publicity, through executive committee sessions for voting on bills, through 
delay, and through "loading a bill with amendments" so as to assure 
adverse action in the other chamber or a presidential veto. 
With respect to the contest between the Congress and the executive, 
to which he has devoted six chapters, Dr. Griffith appears somewhat too 
sanguine in concluding that the streamlining of committees in the Legis-
lative Reorganization Act of 1946 and the expansion of committee staffs 
have halted what Corwin calls presidential "aggrandizement" at the ex-
pense of the Congress.1 Dr. Griffith cites the increase in appropriations 
and personnel for the offices of Legislative Council, the Legislative Reference 
Service, and committee staffs and concludes that the Congress " ..• has 
mastered the problem of recapturing its constitutional role as the independ-
ent policy determiner-a self-respecting co-equal of the bureaucracy, its 
legal master in policy matters, in practice its competent partner or its 
intelligent critic." Actually, the Congress still has a long way to go to im-
prove its committee staffs both in size and in quality before it is strength-
ened to the point where it can resist effectively pressures from the executive 
or from special interest groups. Only by fortifying itself with accurate 
and complete factual information can Congress form and express clearly 
its own independent judgment on national policy. 
1 CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 3d ed., 366 (1948). 
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One long-standing conflict between the executive and legislative branches 
of the government is executive refusal to furnish to the Congress informa-
tion in the possession of the executive departments. Dr. Griffith discusses 
the precedents but fails to take a position, either as a matter of law or 
policy, on whether the discretion in this field should rest with the Congress 
or the executive. In citing Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 426 (1950), he over-
looked noting that the subpoena in question was that of a court, not a 
congressional committee. In connection with Dr. Griffith's recital of Presi-
dent Truman's refusal to honor a congressional subpoena, it is worth 
notice that Senator Truman, as chairman of the Special Senate Committee 
Investigating the National Defense Program, caused subpoenas to be served 
on the· Attorney General of the United States ap.d obtained the material 
the committee desired.2 Historically, a showdown has been avoided 
through compromise and restraint, with the result that there is no authori-
tative court decision on the power of Congress to compel production of 
executive documents. 
In the chapter, "Congress and Localism," Dr. Griffith ably describes the 
role of Congress in protecting local governments from aggrandizement 
by the federal bureaucracy. He might well have mentioned among the 
values "traditionally associated with state and local vitality" the advantage 
of closer and more direct supervision by the people themselves of the acts 
and decisions of officials of local governments than is possible with national 
decision. In reviewing congressional action for the benefit of local govern-
ments, he might have mentioned the movement in the Congress to relieve 
fiscal difficulties of local governments by providing payments in lieu of tax-
ation on federal industrial and commercial properties and se,ntiment in 
Congress favoring overthrow of the doctrine announced by the Supreme 
Court that congressional action in a given field preempts the entire field for 
federal legislation, excluding state action. 
Dr. Griffith effectively answers those political scientists who would 
enhance the power and prestige of political parties at the expense of indi-
vidual legislators. He also differs with those writers who view members 
of Congress solely as pawns in a pressure game of outside influences. In 
describing the role of Congress in educating the public, Dr. Griffith omitted, 
perhaps discreetly, reference to Speaker Rayburn's ban on television and 
radio coverage of committee public hearings. 
Dr. Griffith finds a weakness in broad, top-level planning in the Congress, 
particularly in economic matters. He suggests that function be vested in 
the Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Aside from the questionable 
extension of Joint Committees in a bicameral legislature, his recommenda-
tion ignores the legitimate partisan character of important policy deter-
2 Testimony of Truman Committee Chief Counsel Hugh Fulton in hearings of Moss 
Committee (Special Government Information Subcommittee of the House Government 
Operations Committee) on "Availability of Information From Federal Departments and 
Agencies," Part 3, May 8 and 9, 1956, pp. 525, 540. 
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minations. Despite the past informality of consideration and lack of 
aggressiveness in party leadership and policy committees, responsiveness to 
the public will, the need of collaboration with committee leadership and 
the accounting to which the party in power is held would seem to raise 
serious doubts of the advisability of sterilizing top planning in a bipartisan 
joint committee. 
Dr. Griffith recommends extension of the devices of terminal dates on 
delegated powers and the legislative veto, such as that of disapproval of 
presidential reorganization plans. The terminal date is a powerful weapon, 
because it leaves the initiative and control with the Congress. The legis-
lative veto, however, is a novel and peculiar device vesting vast and general 
legislative authority in the executive. A presidential reorganization plan 
often contains important matters of policy, cannot be amended, must be 
defeated by a constitutional majority vote, and cannot be corrected by sub-
sequent legislation without incurring a presidential veto. Proper strength-
ening of committee staffs should enable the Congress eventually to dispense 
with this makeshift and unnatural legislative device, which is in derogation 
of the constitutional responsibility of Congress as the policy-making 
authority of our government. 
Dr. Griffith's scholarly and sympathetic discussion of the problems and 
challenges modem complex society has posed for our national legislators 
should stimulate and inspire any reader who, like the author, believes "the 
Congress of the United States is the world's best hope of representative 
government." 
George Meader 
Member, House of Representatives, 
2nd District, Michigan 
